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Q: What's the significance of the formation of the Military Honor Commission in 
connection with the kidnappings and disappearances?
A: The Military Honor Commission is the institution used in cases involving the 
military's honor, for example to investigate whether an officer has committed an 
ethical violation. As for its internal mechanism, the officer under investigation doesn't 
need to have a second, or witnesses, or a defense lawyer. He also doesn't need to bring 
in any evidence. What is at question is his honor, because it involves the honor of all 
other officers. So he is brought before officers senior to him, to resolve any ethical 
questions. The Commission will have only two alternatives. Either the officer will be 
able to continue as an officer, or he will not. In other words, the outcome of the 
Commission's investigation will mean either that he is dishonorably discharged or that 
he is allowed to continue his career as an officer. The Commission imposes no other 
sanctions.
Q: So the[se officers] aren't being investigated for criminal offenses?
A: No, the Commission has no authority to handle criminal cases. Such cases are 
settled by the courts, not the Commission. The reason is that it is quite possible for 
someone to be regarded as having committed a crime, but in his capacity as an officer 
he has simply carried out orders. In such an eventuality, he can be haled before a court, 
but will not be discharged from military service. So the task of the Commission is 
merely to investigate whether his actions were carried out in accordance with his 
military duties. In other words, whether or not his mission was carried out in accord 
with military ethics. If not, then he will be discharged from service.
Q: These Kopassus people are accused of kidnappings, but they claim they were 
merely carrying out orders from their superiors. In that case, can they blamed from the 
point of military ethics?
A: If they acted without the knowledge of their superiors, and simply on their own 
account, or such and such officer misused the power given him by the state to vent his 
personal emotions, then he is clearly blameworthy.
Q: But isn't it true that Prabowo says he reported everything to his superior, the 
Commander of the Armed Forces?
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A: If that is true, then he was simply acting as an officer carrying out a mission. And 
those who carry out a mission in their capacity as officers may not be dishonorably 
discharged.
Q: But in this case, Prabowo's superior, General Feisal Tanjung, claims that he never 
ordered Prabowo to carry out kidnappings.
A: That won't wash. If a subordinate reports to his commander, and it turns out that 
the commander does nothing to stop him, it means that he [tacitly] permits his 
subordinate to carry out that mission.
All the more so in a case like this, where the sequestering of the people who were 
kidnapped lasted for months, yet the commander, after receiving the subordinate's 
report, did nothing, this is clearly a sign [English]: what was done was permitted. 
Another example might be a case where a platoon commander reports to his battalion 
commander that his unit is off in a remote area and is planning to seize a hilltop. If the 
commander doesn't tell his subordinate not to proceed, he is effectively approving the 
platoon commander's actions.
Q: Munir of Kontras has stated that resolving this matter via the Commission is a 
mistake. The officers charged should first be court-martialled, and only then brought 
before the Commission. What is your view?
A: He's wrong. The Commission's function is simply an investigation of an officer's 
ethics. They can easily conclude that the officer has committed no criminal offense, 
and yet his behavior has been incompatible with the honorcode of an officer. In other 
words, such cases don't always have to be processed through a court-martial.
Q: Do you think it's enough for Prabowo's case to be settled by the Commission, or 
should he be court-martialled?
A: If it is a matter of a criminal offense, then he has to be court-martialled. The 
principle, however, is that the Commission cannot decide in criminal cases. The 
Commission would be very wrong if it did so, since this is clearly not its mission. Its 
mission is simply to deal with matters concerning the honor of an ABRI officer, not 
criminal offenses.
Q: Should Feisal Tanjung also be investigated?
A: If the investigation proves that Prabowo reported to him, but he did nothing or just 
kept quiet, then, yes, Feisal Tanjung should be questioned. The problem is only who 
would sit on the commission in his case? It would have to be five-star generals! 
[Laughs].
Q: Were you ever Prabowo's immediate superior?
A: Yes. When I was Commander of Division I, he commanded Battalion 328. In those 
days he was still a major.
Q: What is your evaluation of Prabowo?
A: Prabowo is an officer with great potential. He thinks far ahead, and is always 
eager to be way out in front. He also has substantial financial resources and 
connections with power (kekuasaan). And he always wants to be Number One. In 
satisfying these ambitions, he sometimes exceeds his authority. Oversteps his assigned
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task. But even if such cases, in my view at least, the one to blame is not Prabowo, but 
his superior/commander. It is a failure of leadership [English] on the part of his 
superior officer if he cannot ensure that Prabowo is obedient, loyal, and respectful to 
his superiors.
Q: Did Prabowo often act this way when he was under your command?
A: Yes. On one or two occasions he wanted his battalion to be something more than 
just another airborne battalion. He wanted it to be a free fall man [English] battalion. 
But because this wasn't the mission or the assignment of that battalion, I put a stop to 
it. He really does think far ahead, and is very ambitious. He made the proposal to me 
in my capacity as Division Commander. When it came to my attention, I said to him: 
"This isn't your mission, this isn't your assignment, and it isn't within your authority. 
The authority in this case is over there [di Sana], not in this unit [of yours]." In the end, 
he obeyed.
Q: Did he ever overstep his authority?
A: Never so long as I was his commanding officer. In handling Prabowo, a great deal 
depends on the character of his commanding officer. His commanding officer or 
superiors must be men with clear and firm leadership ability.
Q: Did you ever punish or bawl out Prabowo?
A: Yes. We once held a football competition. Prabowo's battalion was beaten by 
Battalion 303 from Cikajang. The match took place at Battalion 328's headquarters. 
As the host team, Battalion 328 felt they were fully prepared and they expected to 
win. But that's not the way it turned out. Now Prabowo, the battalion commander, is 
not a man who takes losing easily. So he messed with a car belonging to Battalion 303 
[so it couldn't run]. So I summoned the whole Battalion, including Prabowo. I told 
them that "sport is training for defeat as well as victory. Our nation takes part in the 
Southeast Asian Games and the Asian Games to learn how to lose as well as to how to 
win. We have to be able to accept defeat, as a nation, in an international event 
[English]. Even more so for us soldiers. We have to be able to accept defeat. 
Otherwise, we can easily destroy the whole population in an area where operations are 
being carried out.
But that won't happen if we learn humility. There are also people who can not accept 
victory [in proportion], so that they use it for self-glorification." That was how I 
chewed out the whole of Battalion 328, including its commander. It was a very tough 
chewing out I gave them. After that, they never did it again. And from that day on up 
till now, my relations with Prabowo have always been good.
A: So his commander has to be strict?
Q: Yes. In fact, out there I once said: "So long as I am Division Commander here, no 
soldier may carry out orders from anyone other than me. If anyone tries to give orders 
outside the chain of command, I'll shoot." I made this clear from the very beginning. So 
probably if people say I'm tough, there's some truth in it [laughs]. During my tour of 
duty there, there were no stupid complaints, for example bitching by one battalion 
commander about another. There was no jealousy. But in my view, this depends on 
leadership. That is why, if it turns out that Prabowo is judged to have done what 
people accuse him of, I see it more a failure of Prabowo's commanding officers than of
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Prabowo himself. I can't accept the statement of Feisal Tanjung that he had no idea 
what was going on. Even worse, he even said he couldn't [i.e. wasn't allowed to] enter 
Kopassus headquarters. This is rubbish. If the ABRI Commander is like that, what's 
the world coming to?
Q: So you mean that Prabowo can be controlled if his superiors are tough?
A: Well, it so happens, that I could control him. But it's not just only me. Plenty of his 
commanders could handle him. Yunus Yosfiah was once Prabowo's commander, and 
he could. Wismoyo Arismunandar also could. Hendropriyono too. All of them could 
control Prabowo.
Q: So who couldn't?
A: [Laughs]. Well, General Hartono even went so far as to use Prabowo to get closer to 
the center of power. Because he looked at Prabowo as Pak Harto's son-in-law, he 
thought he could use him.
Q: What is your estimation of the course of Prabowo's career? Is it true that he was 
given special treatment?
A: Yes, I saw Prabowo getting special treatment. Particularly and excessively at the 
hands of ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung and Army Chief of Staff Hartono. Prabowo 
would never have gotten into the present mess if he had been properly trained and 
developed [dibina] by the Army Chief of Staff. But even before that he got special 
treatment. Normally, after serving as battalion commander, he should have become a 
Kodim [Military District] commander. Given his temperament, if he'd become a Kodim 
commander, it's quite possible he would have got into conflicts with students, or 
workers, or with businessmen. This would have been a learning experience for him, so 
he wouldn't do the same thing when he moved to higher positions. But the fact is he 
never became a Kodim commander, never became a Korem [Military Sub-region] 
commander, Kodam [Regional Command] chief of staff, or Regional Commander. He 
never moved up the military ladder step by step like ordinary officers. But if he had 
gone up through them all, one by one, his temperament would have brought about 
clashes at the lower levels. In that way, he would have learned from the People 
[rakyat]. All of us learn something with every step up the career ladder. The higher we 
go, therefore, the more prudent and wise we get.
Q: Was the special treatment the result of orders from Pak Harto?
A: I don't know. At least while I was his commanding officer, there were no such 
orders. I regarded him as one of my boys [anak buah]. Not an anak buah of Suharto who 
was then President. So, even though in those days there were some people who 
whispered in my ear, I regarded these whispers as nonsense.
Q: Still, it does look as if Prabowo's rapid rise was significantly helped by his being 
Pak Harto's son-in-law.
A: That's right, it looks that way if you compare him with his classmates. He was 
given an easier ride, in that he didn't have to go up rung by rung as is normal in ABRI. 
And he also never entered what you could call the "staff world," where his ideas 
would have had to be formed into clear concepts for presentation to his commander, 
and which could be rejected by his commander.
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Q: Subagyo, the Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Military Honor 
Commission, is a former bodyguard of Pak Harto. Can the Commission be objective?
A: I certainly hope it can be objective, courageous, and honest. The thing is, on paper, 
Subagyo was once Prabowo's commanding officer in Kopassus. When Subagyo was 
Commander-General of Kopassus, Prabowo was his deputy. Yet, operationally, in the 
field, it was very obvious that it was Prabowo who controlled/ran Kopassus,, not 
Bagyo. Bagyo was just a symbol [simbol] at that time. Everyone recognized this. So I 
can't blame people . . . .  After all, it's true that there are suspicions about Subagyo's 
objectivity on the Commission. But then again, who are the four-star generals still on 
active duty aside from Pak Wiranto and Pak Bagyo? Prabowo has three stars, so it's a 
problem isn't it? My guess is that Subagyo was picked for the job [of chairman] 
because Pak Wiranto had no other choice.
Q: Agum Gumelar also was once Prabowo's immediate commanding officer. Can he 
too be objective?
A: Agum Gumelar has been great with Prabowo, meaning, he really exercised good 
leadership towards him. He situated himself this way: I am Prabowo's superior officer, 
and I have to control him. Very fine. Seen through military lenses, from the angle of 
discipline and mission, Agum Gumelar has handled Prabowo much better___
If we use military lenses to view Subagyo vis-a-vis Prabowo, what we'll see is that 
when Subagyo was Commander-General of Kopassus, he was just a symbol of 
Kopassus, while the person who controlled it was Prabowo.
Q: When you look at the Commission's membership, do you think it's possible for 
them to give a really objective evaluation of Prabowo?
A: Well, we had a commission like this at the time of the Santa Cruz affair, and I 
don't see a single person on the present Commission who had any experience there [?? 
Unclear where he means someone who had experience in East Timor, or who sat on the 
earlier Commission, which, after all, was created six years earlier]. Usually, if a 
lieutenant-general is brought before the Commission, its leader is a full general. One is 
enough. In Prabowo's case, it should be a full general on top of a number of lieutenant- 
generals. All the interrogators are lieutenant-generals. But in the case of Muchdi, since 
Muchdi is a major-general, then the interrogators should also be major-generals. [The 
rule thus is that] the interrogators should have the same rank as the interrogated. The 
idea here is to make the officer under interrogation psychologically aware that "your 
feelings and ours are the same. The military honor that you bear [on your shoulders] 
and the military honor we bear are the same."

